Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have proliferated in development studies over the past decades.
Introduction
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become a central tenet of many governments' overseas aid and development policy, where cross-sector partnerships are increasingly perceived as important instruments in addressing global problems (Kolk, Van Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008) . The upsurge of PPPs has been framed as part of a broader trend in which governments are nowadays searching for innovative ways of including actors from the private sector and civil society in the co-production of economic and social outcomes (see for example Khanom, 2010; Lawson, 2011) . Indeed, the very idea underlying partnerships between governments and the private sector is the notion of networksociety, in which policy outcomes are increasingly realised through cross-sector collaboration and joint decision-making among multiple stakeholders (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007) . Current partnership trends in development studies include issues such as infrastructure development (Trebilcock & Rosenstock, 2015) , global health (Barr, 2007) , women's empowerment (Bexell, 2012) , poverty alleviation (Spielman, Hartwich & Grebmer, 2010) and climate change responses (Forsyth, 2010) . Hence, across the discipline of developing studies, there is an increasing belief in PPPs as a way of aligning Accepted Article public, private and civil-society organisations with the potential to accelerate the socio-economic development of third-world countries (Weihe, 2008) .
However, despite a growing worldwide tendency since the early 1990s to promote and utilise PPPs as a development tool (Mitchell-Weaver & Manning, 1991) , there is still no clear definition of what constitutes a development PPP as a concept and practice (Lawson, 2011) . The conceptual nature of partnerships is thus somewhat perplexing and oftentimes vaguely defined, covering a broad variety of cross-sector partnerships and practices (Forsyth, 2010; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011) . As pointed out by several scholars, the consequence is quite tangible as it undermines PPP as a term and leaves all and nothing to be considered partnerships in a development context (Jamali, 2004) .
From an empirical viewpoint, the lack of clear terminology makes it difficult to successfully implement (Miraftab, 2004) and evaluate current PPP practice (Lawson, 2011) . Moreover, while proponents of PPPs make the claim for stakeholder inclusion and improved efficiency, the empirical literature points to lack of evidence regarding the effectiveness of PPPs in developing countries and of circumstances in which PPPs are preferable to other approaches such as privatization or direct government subsidies (Barr, 2007; Trebilcock & Rosenstock, 2015) .
The purpose of this article is to contribute to further understanding of PPP as a development tool by providing an overview of key PPP themes in development research and to empirically explore how partnerships between government and business have been subject to changing configurations over time. Exploring the PPP notion and current partnership practice represents an important step towards understanding the circumstances in which PPPs are superior to other approaches and instruments in development policy. Specifically, the article addresses the following research questions:
What characterises PPPs between government and business in development policy, and how has the practice of partnerships empirically unfolded over time? By exploring how PPPs have changed over time as a development policy tool, the article extends the insights from previous studies that have examined international programmes for development PPPs (Davies, 2011; Deva, 2006; Reed & Reed, 2009; Richter, 2003; Utting & Zammit, 2009) , and the implementation and impact of individual PPP programmes in specific developing countries (Folke, 2009; Kragelund, 2005; Lund-Thomsen, 2009 ).
The article's contribution to previous literature is thus additional clarification of the content and meaning of the partnership notion as well as empirically exploring government-business relations in contemporary PPP development policy.
The empirical setting of the study is a longitudinal analysis of five consecutive Danish foreign aid partnership programmes that were implemented from 1993 to 2014. Partnerships between the public and private sector have been a consistent feature of Danish development policy over the last 20 years, thus making it a suitable empirical setting for exploring the practice of PPPs in national forThis article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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eign aid policy. The empirical data was collected through a comprehensive document study and twelve in-depth semi-structured interviews (Barzelay, Gaetani, Velarde, & Cejudo, 2003) with key public and private actors in Danish development policy 3 . The article offers a detailed insight into how the partnerships are implemented and changed over time in national development policy, and which underlying factors influence this development. Moreover, as the analysis will show, the PPP programmes have received considerable and continuing attention in the news media and exemplify how private sector involvement in development assistance can be a contested issue. The article develops in two steps. While the first part examines key themes of PPP as a concept in development policy (see also Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011) , the second part presents the empirical analysis detailing how, under the broad notion of PPP, government and business relations in Danish foreign aid programmes have been configured and reconfigured over time.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. First, in Section 2, we frame eight key partnership characteristics derived from the literature on PPPs in development policy. Next, in Section 3, we briefly present the methods used and the empirical setting of the analysis. Then, in Section 4, we set out to analyse the configuration and gradual reconfiguration of partnerships elements in the five Danish foreign aid programmes. Finally, in section 5, we discuss the lessons learned and conclude on the findings.
Literature review: Themes in development PPP research
In order to begin addressing the conceptual muddle surrounding PPP as a development tool, we review previous attempts at defining and characterising PPPs (see for example Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Khanom, 2010; Weihe, 2008; Wettenhall, 2005) . We approach the matter in a somewhat pragmatic way, acknowledging that the development field is a broad policy area encompassing various traditions and streams of literature. Hence, we do not intend to claim that the characteristics presented here represent an exhaustive list of elements that a partnership must conform to. Instead, we aim to characterise PPPs in more detail in order to gain a better understanding of key partnership elements that can form the basis for empirical analysis and evaluation of PPP as a practice in development policy.
The partnership characteristics that are set out below are based on a review of 18 development studies published in the period from 1991 to 2016. Based on a systematic literature search which resulted in an initial list of 50 studies, the 18 (mainly) journal articles were chosen due to their
Accepted Article
focus on partnerships as a development approach from a purely or partly theoretical and conceptual perspective (see Table A1 in appendix for search methods). The studies represent a broad understanding of PPP that includes partnerships between public and private sectors, tri-sector (public, private, civil society) partnerships and multi-stakeholder partnerships within different sub-areas of development policy such as global health, climate change, poverty relief as well as foreign aid more generally. The review approach thereby excluded purely empirical studies or articles focusing only on specific PPP projects in developing countries. The review emphasized the following eight key characteristics of development PPPs:
 Roles, sharing of resources, risks and responsibilities  Participants from the public, civil society, and private sectors in donor and recipient countries 
 Sustainable effects
These eight characteristics of development PPPs are outlined in more detail below and an overview of the literature review is presented in Table 1 .
Roles, sharing of resources, risks and responsibilities
In contrast to traditional and rather formalized infrastructure PPPs (Weihe, 2008) , development PPPs are, to a larger extent characterised by non-hierarchical processes based on shared responsibilities, resources, and division of roles where the partners learn from each other and produce new knowledge (Pinkse & Kolk, 2012) . One partner -often the government -performs a steering role or has the leadership to mediate and direct the partnership (Miraftab, 2004) . Sharing of resources also refers to the partners' complementary competences, knowledge and expertise. Governments are often donors that help reduce risks through partnerships by providing risk capital or demand for the services or products produced as well as provide a local network, while the businesses bring in knowledge, technology and investments (Kolk et al., 2008; Simon, Schellekens, & de Groot, 2014) .
The principle of risk sharing is a fundamental mechanism in PPP that serves the important role of aligning public and private incentives in the projects (Grimsey & Lewis 2002) . Theory on risk transfer establishes that risks in PPPs should be allocated to the partner who is best able to manage This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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each specific risk or carries the risk at the lowest cost (Medda, 2007: 214) . For instance, governments are often best suited to handle risks related to changes in political and regulatory environments, whereas risks associated with project management and program implementation are often allocated with the private partners (Liu and Wilkinson, 2014) . However, while the general principles of risk sharing in partnerships are well-established, our review of the PPP development literature shows that risk sharing, mutuality and complementarity is often a normative claim presumed to be important incentives for actors to partner, but in practice the degree of sharing of risks, benefits and responsibilities vary markedly (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011) and must be validated empirically to assess the degree of partnership (Schäferhoff, Campe, & Kaan, 2009 ).
Participants: Public, private and civil society actors
To avoid 'terminological sloppiness' (Miraftab, 2004: 93) in regards to who the different actors in a development partnership actually are, as this could pose a challenge in regards to roles and expectations, it is important to address and define the participating partners carefully when implementing and evaluating PPPs. Certainly, the participating actors bring in the resources, competencies and knowledge that underpin development and implementation of any type of PPP. Development partnerships are often transnational in character and network-oriented due to the constellation of participating actors from different sectors and countries (Schäferhoff et al., 2009) . PPPs can thus be viewed as a model to coordinate the efforts of different actors involved and/or present in the developing countries through formalised and non-hierarchical relationships (Lawson, 2011; Weihe, 2008) . International organisations, public and private entities, and civil society organizations from the respective donor and recipient countries participate in development PPPs, which can either take the form of trisector, public-private or multi-stakeholder partnerships (Forsyth, 2010; Kolk et al., 2008; Simon et al., 2014) .
Partnership commitment
Development partnerships can be based on different degrees of commitment with some participants being highly involved and others being more passive (Pinkse & Kolk, 2012) . Moreover, the relationship can eithe be of a loose or formal character (Barr, 2007; Schäferhoff et al., 2009 ). For instance, NGOs and third-party national organisations are not necessarily directly involved but help create an optimal environment for the PPP through donor money, networks and programs (Weihe, 2008) , just as companies are potentially less involved if the partnership is of a rule-setting nature (rather than a specific project) aimed at filling a regulatory gap (Pinkse & Kolk, 2012) . Whether it constitutes an actual partnership depends among other things on whether the relationship is of a consultative or This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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partnering nature (Forsyth, 2010) , if there is commitment to a common goal (Barr, 2007) , or if the role of one partner is limited to financial investments only (Mitchell-Weaver & Manning, 1991) . A wide array of public-private mixes are being referred to as partnerships even when it is merely a delegation of functions from government to a private actor (Börzel & Risse, 2005) , which compromises the development effort that is key to PPP as pointed out by other scholars (Miraftab, 2004; Wettenhall, 2005) . Indeed, a way to ensure that the partnership is not just rhetoric is to establish relational contracts (Wettenhall, 2005) and/or agreement concerning specific contractual deliveries (Forsyth, 2010) .
Organisation and governance of the partnership
The next partnership dimension concerns the organization and governance of the PPP. To a large extent, this dimension depends on the type of development partnership (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011) . PPPs can have different degrees of stakeholder influence and constraints (Reed & Reed, 2009 ), or be organised around a purpose of influencing each other's decision-making processes, taskforces to set direction, or even establishment of new organizations (Buse & Walt, 2000; MitchellWeaver & Manning, 1991) . Related to the degree of partnership, organization can also depend on the formal arrangement of the PPP and how involved the various partners are (Forsyth, 2010) . Moreover, in order to achieve a non-hierarchical partnership based on consensual decision-making, some scholars point out that a board or forum might be put in place as part of the organizational structure of the PPP (Wettenhall, 2005) .
Alignment with local context
A less prevailing but nonetheless important perspective in the literature concerns the alignment of development PPPs with the local context. Alignment is partly about synergy between the involved actors, establishing local trust and commitment, but also about achieving genuine collaboration between the partners from donors and recipient countries to ensure successful partnerships (Wettenhall, 2005) . Through partnerships with non-state actors, donors can facilitate trust with the local community and enhance cooperation from essential organisations (Simon et al., 2014) . Moreover, as argued by Barr (2007) , it is crucial to take into consideration whether the partnership requires or imposes new regional or national laws, agencies or regulation in the local context.
Common development objective
The overall purpose of a development PPP is, unsurprisingly, to promote development in third world countries (Weihe, 2008) . PPPs are not development strategies in themselves, but they are characterThis article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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ised by a joint development objective (Mitchell-Weaver & Manning, 1991) oriented towards capacity building and facilitating access to goods and services (see for example Khanom, 2010) , which sets them apart from PPPs in other policy areas. The specific components of the development goal might vary and be more or less specific; for example, vaccine distribution (Chataway & Smith, 2006) ; global health improvement (Buse & Walt, 2000) or poverty alleviation (Spielman, Hartwich & Grebmer, 2010) . However, the shared development objective among the partners is not easily achieved as the goals of governmental actors and companies can be difficult to align (Kolk et al., 2008) . Although development and individual objectives need not be incompatible, Kolk et al. (2008) for instance find that companies are more likely to undertake development work they can link to their core activities.
There is thus a delicate balance between various stakeholder objectives to ensure that societal relevant partnership objectives rather than mere financing of private businesses' activities are accomplished (Miraftab, 2004; Wettenhall, 2005) .
Function and purpose
The literature stresses that PPPs have different specific functions in development aid by which they should be assessed (Schäferhoff et al., 2009) . Partnerships can be project-oriented, sector and area specific, or even globally oriented (Kolk et al., 2008) . Other types of PPP have specific governance functions that were previously carried out under the auspices of national governments such as rulesetting, information sharing, or policy implementation (Börzel & Risse, 2005; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012; Schäferhoff et al., 2009) . A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) partnership is for instance a type of PPP which is often rule-setting (developing codes of conduct) or certifies initiatives (Reed & Reed, 2009 ). Some scholars furthermore argue that PPPs have become popular, as they themselves are associated with good governance in the form of trust, collaboration, responsibility and improved reputation (Utting & Zammit, 2009) , while on the other hand being criticised as public funding of private interests especially in the most advanced of the developing countries (Lawson, 2011) .
Sustainable effects
Empirical studies illustrate that the time frame for development PPPs differs markedly from project to project (Davies, 2011; Lawson, 2011) . For instance, a report from the United States development agency shows that development PPPs carried out between 1999 and 2007 lasted from one to seven years or more (USAID, 2010) . Despite the variation in time frame for individual partnerships, the long-term goal is to achieve sustainable effects (Pinkse & Kolk, 2012) . The difference between PPPs and other types of development activities is the inherent role of private partners in realizing longterm goals. This can be ensured, for example, by basing the projects on businesses' core interests This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. and thereby keeping the businesses committed in the long-run (Lawson, 2011) , but without compromising the development objective as pointed out above. From this perspective, the effectiveness of PPPs can be evaluated based on not just partnership output, such as the provision of anti-malaria drugs, but the long-term impact of reducing malaria-related death rates as exemplified by Schäfer-hoff et al. (2009) . Depending on the type of partnership, the intended long-term effects can also be outcomes such as improving efficiency in non-competitive markets (Reed & Reed, 2009) or creating institutions for better healthcare (Simon et al., 2014) . Khanom, 2010; Kolk et al., 2008; Lawson, 2011; Miraftab, 2004; Mitchell-Weaver & Manning, 1991; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012; Reed & Reed, 2009; Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Simon et al., 2014; Weihe, 2008) Sharing of resources, risks and responsibilities among partners (Barr, 2007; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Khanom, 2010; Kolk et al., 2008; Lawson, 2011; Miraftab, 2004; Mitchell-Weaver & Manning, 1991; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012; Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Simon et al., 2014 ) Degree of partnership based on commitment and type of relation (such as contractual) (Barr, 2007; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Börzel & Risse, 2005; Forsyth, 2010; Mitchell-Weaver & Manning, 1991; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012; Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Utting & Zammit, 2009; Weihe, 2008; Wettenhall, 2005) Organisation of the partnership based on form and decision-making (Barr, 2007; Buse & Walt, 2000; Forsyth, 2010; Lawson, 2011; Mitchell-Weaver & Manning, 1991; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012; Reed & Reed, 2009; Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Weihe, 2008; Wettenhall, 2005) Alignment with and consideration of local context and regulation (Barr, 2007; Simon et al., 2014; Wettenhall, 2005) Common objective oriented towards promoting development in third-world countries (Buse & Walt, 2000; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Chataway & Smith, 2006 ; see for example Khanom, 2010, 153, 155; Kolk et al., 2008; Lawson, 2011; Miraftab, 2004; Mitchell-Weaver & Manning, 1991; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012; Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Simon et al., 2014; Weihe, 2008; Wettenhall, 2005) This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Summary and definition of partnership characteristics
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Specific partnership function such as rule-setting or project-oriented (Börzel & Risse, 2005; Kolk et al., 2008; Lawson, 2011; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012; Reed & Reed, 2009; Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Utting & Zammit, 2009 ) Sustainable effects in the form of a lasting impact beyond the partnership (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Lawson, 2011; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012; Reed & Reed, 2009; Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Simon et al., 2014) Source: The authors Based on the review of previous literature, we can now define development PPPs as more or less formalized collaborations between government, business and/or third sector organisations based on shared knowledge, competencies and risks, and developed with the purpose of accomplishing longterm social and/or economic development in third-world countries. This conceptualisation stresses several aspects that differentiate partnership from public/private relations purely based on contracts. With regard to their structure, PPPs are characterised by non-hierarchical principal-principal (rather than principal-agent) relations (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011) , which can either take the form of formal contracts or more informal relations. PPP also involves a shared effort among the partners to achieve joint outcomes, synergy or added value (Huxham & Vangen, 2004) defined as an outcome that the partners could not have achieved by acting singlehandedly.
In addition, the concept of risk sharing is crucial to PPP (Medda, 2007) , because it distributes tasks and responsibilities in a way that incentivises all partners to contribute to joint outcomes. Our definition also highlights that participants in development PPPs can be both public, private for-profit and civil society actors, which can participate with various amounts of resources and commitment. In this regard, we adopt a view similar to Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011: 3) and recognize that partnership is a relative rather than categorical phenomenon, thus meaning that different combinations of partnership actors, commitment, formalization and mutuality can form a PPP (see also Weihe, 2008) . Finally, with regard to the purpose and outcomes of PPP, our definition stresses that partnership projects can have varying goals, though a minimum definition involves a focus on sustainable (often long-term) effects in the context of developing countries (Lawson, 2011; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012) .
In the remainder of the article, we turn our focus from conceptual to empirical exploration of the partnerships notion. The first section sets the empirical scene for the analysis and briefly explains the methods and empirical data. The section that follows broadly draws on the concepts derived from the PP development literature and examines how government and business relations in Danish foreign aid programmes have developed over twenty years.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Empirical setting: PPPs in Danish development policy
PPPs in Danish foreign aid policy constitute an appropriate empirical setting for exploring partnership practice in several respects. Partnerships between the public and private sector have been a consistent feature in Danish development policy over the last 20 years through Danida's business programmes, where the Danish business sector has been involved in both the design and implementation of the programmes. Danida is the governmental organisation in charge of Danish foreign aid activities, operating as an agency under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Danida's business programmes only constitute a small part of the overall government budget for bilateral development assistance, but they represent an important interdependence.
4 From the public sector's point of view, Danida has made use of the business sector's expertise, knowhow, and resources to improve the conditions for private sector growth in developing countries. Danish businesses, on the other hand, have received financial subsidies and guidance as a way to handle and gain access to the difficult markets Danida, 2001; Danida, 2004b; Kragelund, 2005) .
The term PPP did not appear on the Danish development agenda until 2004 (Danida, 2004a) , but by then collaboration between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish business sector had already been a common practice since the first business programme, the Private Sector Development
Programme, was launched in the early 1990s. 5 Figure 1 illustrates the timeline for the five government/business programmes. In 2011, the DBP budget was 300 million out of approx. 11 billion DKK in total bilateral aid (Danida, 2013b) . 6 In 2014, the DBP programme was suspended (Danida, 2016) , see discussion. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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In this study, we analyse all five programmes to get a comprehensive understanding of how partnership practice developed over time and what the reasons are for the reconfiguration of certain partnership elements, which are identified by applying the PPP characteristics presented in the first part of the article. The empirical material was collected through a document study that includes newspaper articles, Danida's annual reports and minutes of relevant meetings, guidelines for the business programmes, programmes pamphlets, and government strategies for Danish development assistance. This information has been extended and validated through 12 semi-structured expert interviews with key informants responsible for and/or involved in the programmes. Interviewees were granted anonymity and interviews focused on getting insights into and interpretations of the design process of the programmes and the considerations surrounding it; in other words information that was not possible to achieve through the documents (Barzelay et al., 2003; Kvale, 2007) . The interviewees represent key public and private actors in the Danish business sector and within Danida that have experience with, are currently working with, or used to work with the development and administration of one or more of the programmes.
The data analysis focuses on the development of the partnership dimensions of the programmes using the eight partnership dimensions as a structuring framework. Hence, the analysis of interviews and the document study was carried out in order to identify changes and developments in participating actors, roles and responsibilities, financial resources, objectives, long-term effects, organisation and function of the partnership programmes over time. Moreover, the purpose has been to identify explanations as to why the reconfiguration of the partnership elements has occurred by incorporating this as a central aspect of the interviews with key actors and in the analysis of the collected documents.
Exploring partnership practice: Analysis of the five PPP programmes
In this section, we present the empirical analysis of how, under the notion of partnership, government and business relations in Danish foreign aid programmes have developed over a twenty-year period. The analysis is structured according to four broad themes, building on the key concepts from the review of the PPP development literature.
Changing partnership actors, roles and responsibilities
Looking first at the composition of roles and participants in PPPs, the analysis shows that the rules on 
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and applicant -to be either a business organisation or a cluster of businesses, and the public partner could include other Danish or local ministries supplemented by civil society actors, research institutions and so forth (Danida, 2009 ). The B2B-programme on the other hand was strictly a partnership between a Danish business and a local business facilitated by Danida's support . The DBP-programme from 2011 required that one local and one Danish business as a minimum was involved and that the Danish company was the applicant and project leader (although from May 2013 a cluster of Danish companies could apply if one company alone could not fulfil the requirements).
With those terms satisfied, complementary actors such as NGOs, business organisations, and public institutions could participate if they had the necessary resources (Danida, 2013c) . Figure 2 illustrates the participating actors' roles.
Figure 2. Participating actors and their roles
Source: The authors
In regards to Danida's role, all programmes entail a partnership with Danida based on a principle of added value (Danida, 2006b ). This means that Danida can only participate as a partner if it leads to activities and efforts that would not otherwise have taken place (Danida, 2013c) . More specifically, Danida's role consists of 1) a financial subsidy depending on the respective phases of the partnerships, 2) supporting the Danish businesses through counselling and guidance, among other things concerning the local market conditions and identifying possible local partners free of charge, and 3) monitoring the projects, for instance through annual on-site visits and progress reports (see for example Danida, 2006b; Danida, 2013c) .
The Danish public actor's role through all the programmes is thereby consistent but quite limited considering the PPP characteristics on actor participation and roles presented earlier in this arti- This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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and local partner in all programmes (Danida, 2006b, 13) . Hence, the Danish private sector partner and the local actor in the recipient country carry all legal responsibility and risks associated with the partnership (Danida, 2011b) . However, the completed interviews and document study clearly indicate that Danida is responsible for what might be called implicit risks such as when a partnership projects fails. This leads to risks such as bad publicity and reduced support among the broader public.
We will return to this issue throughout the analysis and Danida's somewhat complicated role in the programmes will be discussed in the last section of the article.
Reducing the public subsidy
Danida's investment in the partnerships takes place through a financial subsidy. This means that a certain percentage of the Danish private partner's expenses are reimbursed within a maximum limit, and this percentage has fluctuated quite a bit over time (Danida, 2011a) 7
. The DPB-programme from 2011 constituted the lowest yet with 50 per cent in the implementation phase as opposed to 90 per cent in the first partnership programme, the PSDP (Danida, 1994b; Danida, 2013c) . In between these two poles, the financial support was 60 per cent in the PPP-programme (Danida, 2006b ), 60-90 per cent in the IPD-programme (Danida, 2009) , and 75-90 per cent in the B2B-programme depending on the respective phases . As this brief overview illustrates, Danida's subsidy to private business has undergone a reduction over the years.
Based on the document study and interviews, this development is ascribed to changing political priorities and public concerns. The design of the PSDP in the early 1990s was based on a request from the government that Danish development assistance was to 'involve the business sector more and closer in both the design and implementation of the bilateral development aid ... in close cooperation with Danida and the recipient countries' (Danida, 1994a, p. 87) . Until then, Danish businesses' point of entrance to the developing countries' difficult markets had been the so-called government loans that were given to the recipient countries to make purchases of goods and raw material in Denmark, also known as the percentage of return (Kragelund, 2005) . However, the government loans were not perceived as promoting Danish exports to developing countries sufficiently, and in recent years the percentage of return has decreased (Danida, 1993) . Hence, Danida launched the PSDPprogramme as a way of involving the private sector in more active partnerships (Pedersen, 2006) .
The influence of the private actor in designing the PSDP was significant and among others in large Accepted Article part based on a proposal from an interest organisation for businesses, Danish Industry (DI), in 1992.
The administrative director of DI at the time was also a part of Danida's board of directors in 1993
and thereby able to participate actively in designing the PSDP (Kjar & Grothen, 2005; Kragelund, 2005) .
The fluctuating and gradual reduction in support since then appear to reflect an important change in Danida's priority from involving the Danish business sector to ensuring their willingness and ability to invest beyond Danida's support to achieve long-term successful projects (Danida, 2011a) . Several of the interviewees also pointed to the news media and the public opinion as a crucial factor in this change of priority. The reduced support can be viewed as Danida's attempt at accommodating the critique of the programmes as tax payer money being used for Danish business aid, not development aid (Faber, 2001; Kjar & Grothen, 2005) . 
Towards a stronger emphasis on development and sustainable effects
Overall, the objective of the respective partnership programmes has changed from a focus on Danish exports to reducing poverty by promoting social and economic development in third world countries.
In the early 1990s, the political emphasis that was attributed to involving the Danish private sector in development policy was reflected in the rhetoric concerning the PSDP-programme. The programme This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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had a significant focus on achieving increased growth and employment in Denmark by creating more export markets for Danish businesses (Danida, 1993) . The PSDP was presented as an opportunity to take advantage of the resources and skills of the Danish private sector to create more and better development aid (Danida, 1993) .
The rhetoric has changed markedly since then. In a pamphlet for the start-up facility under the PSDP-programme ten years after the program was initially launched, the introduction highlights development in the recipient countries as the main purpose of the programme (Danida, 2004b) . This change in objective is also evident in the PPP-programme from 2004, which makes it clear that 'Public Private Partnerships is about the social responsibility of businesses' (Danida, 2004a, p. 2) . In the DBP-programme, there is a focus on creating jobs, strengthening the local competitive position, and promoting CSR (Danida, 2013a) . The IPD-programme is also an example of this development. It was made up of two facilities: BoP (Base of the Pyramid) and CSR, hence targeting the poorest people in the priority countries and the Danish business' social responsibility (Danida, 2009 ).
In line with the development in objectives, the concrete programme measurements have multiplied and become more specific. Whereas the development requirements in assessing the partnerships were limited and unspecific in the PSDP (Kragelund, 2005) , four specific impact criteria are mentioned in the B2B-programme . In the IPD-programme, the six development criteria reflect the UN's Global Compact (Danida, 2009) , and in the DBP-programme partnership approval depends on no less than nine development measures and two key indicators; job creation and CSR (Danida, 2013c) . In the DBP-and IPD-programme, it is also required that the partners establish a baseline within the preparation or study phase on which to compare the results on key indicators as the partnership progresses (Danida, 2013c) .
Based on an interview with a private partner involved in the development of several of the programmes, the explanation for this development is Danida's attempt to achieve a higher success rate in partnership projects, both in order to keep the government satisfied and to minimize the risk of scandals for the media to uncover, as Danida were met by continued critique of not only the PDSP but also of the following programmes. In 2005, this induced the Minister of Development Corporation to request an analysis of the PSDP with the Foreign Affairs Committee -a decision which was perceived as political criticism of Danida's work (Politiken, 2005a) . The Committee released its report in 2006 which became the founding stones for the B2B-programme (Danida, 2006c) . The main conclusion was that the purpose of fighting poverty in the developing countries needed to be specified as 'the support is meant to benefit the businesses in these countries' (Danida, 2006c, p. 6) . The report, which emphasised undocumented results, insufficient preparation before implementation, and unsustainable partnerships, implied once again wasted tax payer money, and this was part of the conThis article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
siderations made by Danida when they eliminated the PSDP and established the B2B programme (Dejgaard, 2006; Faber, 2001 ).
However, the B2B-programme was perceived as an insufficient change from the PSDPprogramme and some members of Parliament demanded a complete shutdown of the programmes (Nyhedsbrevet 3F, 2006) . In 2009, it was furthermore revealed that Danida had ignored previous negative evaluations of the business programmes, while in 2012 a TV-show further disclosed Danish companies' intentional fraud through the B2B-programme (Carlsen, 2009; U-landsnyt, 2012) . These recurring scandals created a constant need for Danida to re-emphasise the development objective of the programmes. This is substantiated by a statement from the Minister of Development in 2012
saying that the most recent programme -Danida Business Partnerships -was based on higher and more specific requirements, screening of partners, and reduced subsidies to ensure committed partners (U-landsnyt, 2012).
Variations in programme organisation, requirements and functions
Danida's partnerships with businesses typically last 3-5 years and are divided into two or three phases with separate application forms and contracts. The PSDP-and PPP-programme consisted of a oneyear preparatory phase followed by an implementation phase (Danida, 2006b; Kragelund, 2005) . The PSDP was furthermore divided into a so-called Business Partnership, which entailed two phases, and a one-year Start-up Facility which in itself had a preparation and implementation phase for testing specific ideas and projects. It included a 100 per cent reimbursement and could also form the basis of the Business Partnership (Danida, 2004b) . Moreover, the IPD-, B2B-, and DBP-programmes were divided into a contact and partner identification phase, a study or pilot phase, and lastly the project implementation phase Danida, 2009; Danida, 2013c) .
Although there appears to be a more elaborate screening process for the partners in the DBPprogramme (U-landsnyt, 2012), most of the screening requirements for both the local and Danish private partner have remained more or less unchanged throughout all the programmes. They concern the necessary financial means, employee resources, and experience. Among other things, the Danish company must have no outstanding debts to authorities and have at least two years of commercial experience in the core business field of the project. Organisation of the partnership, on the other hand, has changed markedly since the PSDP. The PSDP had favourable conditions for the Danish private partner in order to implement the government strategy and the working group's recommendations to increase private sector participation in the early 1990s. As such, all expenses were for instance reimbursed in the Start-up Facility (Danida, 2004b) , it was possible to obtain financial support for activities solely aimed at promoting exports (Danida, 1994a) 
and to have prior ownership in
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the local partner participating in the PSDP, that is a Danish business was able to apply for financial aid for a subsidiary company (Politiken, 2005b) .
This was also possible in the PPP-programme, where the guidelines state that 'Danish subsidiaries may, in certain cases, qualify as local partners' -as long as the partnership has spill-over effects beyond the local partner (Danida, 2006b, p. 13) . In the B2B, IPD, and DBP, the Danish applicant was not allowed to have any form of ownership or to be a shareholder in the local partner prior to the partnership Danida, 2009; Danida, 2013c) . This change in organisation can once again be explained by the continued critique in the public realm, where there was a focus on taxpayer money funding the development of Danish subsidiaries through Danida (Politiken, 2005a; Politiken, 2005b ).
The configuration and gradual reconfiguration of the different partnership characteristics in Danish development policy are summarised in Table 2 .
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Discussion and conclusion
The analysis of the five partnership programmes highlights significant changes in Danida's business programmes over time. Based on the partnership characteristics derived from the development literature, the Danish case illustrates a complex practice of implementing and evaluating PPPs in national development policy and how national influences rather than development-related concerns lead to a gradual reconfiguration of the content and characteristics of the partnership programmes.
The analysis shows that two key factors have in particular been driving the reconfiguration of the partnership elements in the programmes. Initially, a political request to involve the Danish business sector in Danish development aid created favourable conditions for the Danish private partner in the earliest programmes. These conditions were changed because of continued public critique and because of Danida's responsibility towards the government and the taxpayers to ensure successful partnerships. Another important change was moving from allowing to banning Danish business ownership in local business partners. Furthermore, the objective and specific purposes of the programmes have undergone a marked development from an explicit focus on Danish exports to emphasising social and economic development in third-world countries.
The development in the Danish case over time brings forth the fundamental question of whether Danida's business programmes do in fact constitute partnerships according to key PPP characteristics described in the literature. The analysis showed that Danida's role has been relatively consistent although limited to a financial subsidy, guidance and monitoring, whereas all risks and responsibilities have been assigned to the private and local partners. According to the conceptual characteristics of PPP from the literature, government-business programmes do not constitute partnerships if the public actor more or less only participates through financial investments (see for example Khanom, 2010; Mitchell-Weaver & Manning, 1991) . However, the analysis also showed that Danida's subsidy has been gradually reduced over time, thereby implying a more equal public and private investment, and that Danida has in fact been bearing two important PPP risks; political changes and public criticism.
Returning to the overall aim of the study, which was to conceptually and empirically explore
PPPs between government and business in development policy, the article has framed eight common characteristics of PPP in development policy research: 1) roles, sharing of resources, risks and responsibilities; 2) participants from the public, civil society, and private sectors; 3) partnership commitment; 4) organisation and governance; 5) alignment with local context; 6) common development objective; 7) partnership function and purpose, and; 8) sustainable effects. By applying the eight PPP characteristics on the empirical case of the five programmes in Danish development policy, the artiThis article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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cle has shown how "partnership" has been subject to changing content and meaning over time. The programme changes exemplify the slippery character of the partnership notion and the difficulties of successfully implementing PPPs in national development policy. The latter point is reinforced by the suspension of the fifth programme in 2014 based on an evaluation which showed limited development impact (Danida, 2016) .
For future research there is potential for broadening the scope from a single to a comparative case study of several countries and programmes. This will make it possible to compare experience with development PPPs across multiple countries and programmes and draw broader lessons on how and why development PPPs change over time. Furthermore, although increasingly more studies are evaluating the outcomes of partnerships in development aid (Ibem, 2011; Jamali, 2004; LundThomsen, 2009; Van Tulder & Pfisterer, 2008) , the number of empirical studies is still limited and often based on rather different notions of what development PPPs are. Further elaborating and clarifying development PPPs could contribute to future precision in identifying partnerships and evaluating their performance. There is thus a need for more systematic analysis of the implementation and impact of development PPPs, which will make it possible to assess whether and how these partnerships are in fact contributing to the social and economic development in third-world countries. 
